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authorRalf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>1994-11-28 11:59:19 +0000
committer <ralf@linux-mips.org>1994-11-28 11:59:19 +0000
commit1513ff9b7899ab588401c89db0e99903dbf5f886 (patch)
treef69cc81a940a502ea23d664c3ffb2d215a479667 /fs/fcntl.c
Import of Linus's Linux 1.1.68
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/fcntl.c')
-rw-r--r--fs/fcntl.c188
1 files changed, 188 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/fs/fcntl.c b/fs/fcntl.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d3226eb01
--- /dev/null
+++ b/fs/fcntl.c
@@ -0,0 +1,188 @@
+/*
+ * linux/fs/fcntl.c
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1991, 1992 Linus Torvalds
+ */
+
+#include <asm/segment.h>
+
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/stat.h>
+#include <linux/fcntl.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+
+extern int fcntl_getlk(unsigned int, struct flock *);
+extern int fcntl_setlk(unsigned int, unsigned int, struct flock *);
+extern int sock_fcntl (struct file *, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg);
+
+static int dupfd(unsigned int fd, unsigned int arg)
+{
+ if (fd >= NR_OPEN || !current->files->fd[fd])
+ return -EBADF;
+ if (arg >= NR_OPEN)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ while (arg < NR_OPEN)
+ if (current->files->fd[arg])
+ arg++;
+ else
+ break;
+ if (arg >= NR_OPEN)
+ return -EMFILE;
+ FD_CLR(arg, &current->files->close_on_exec);
+ (current->files->fd[arg] = current->files->fd[fd])->f_count++;
+ return arg;
+}
+
+asmlinkage int sys_dup2(unsigned int oldfd, unsigned int newfd)
+{
+ if (oldfd >= NR_OPEN || !current->files->fd[oldfd])
+ return -EBADF;
+ if (newfd == oldfd)
+ return newfd;
+ /*
+ * errno's for dup2() are slightly different than for fcntl(F_DUPFD)
+ * for historical reasons.
+ */
+ if (newfd > NR_OPEN) /* historical botch - should have been >= */
+ return -EBADF; /* dupfd() would return -EINVAL */
+#if 1
+ if (newfd == NR_OPEN)
+ return -EBADF; /* dupfd() does return -EINVAL and that may
+ * even be the standard! But that is too
+ * weird for now.
+ */
+#endif
+ sys_close(newfd);
+ return dupfd(oldfd,newfd);
+}
+
+asmlinkage int sys_dup(unsigned int fildes)
+{
+ return dupfd(fildes,0);
+}
+
+asmlinkage int sys_fcntl(unsigned int fd, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
+{
+ struct file * filp;
+ struct task_struct *p;
+ int task_found = 0;
+
+ if (fd >= NR_OPEN || !(filp = current->files->fd[fd]))
+ return -EBADF;
+ switch (cmd) {
+ case F_DUPFD:
+ return dupfd(fd,arg);
+ case F_GETFD:
+ return FD_ISSET(fd, &current->files->close_on_exec);
+ case F_SETFD:
+ if (arg&1)
+ FD_SET(fd, &current->files->close_on_exec);
+ else
+ FD_CLR(fd, &current->files->close_on_exec);
+ return 0;
+ case F_GETFL:
+ return filp->f_flags;
+ case F_SETFL:
+ /*
+ * In the case of an append-only file, O_APPEND
+ * cannot be cleared
+ */
+ if (IS_APPEND(filp->f_inode) && !(arg & O_APPEND))
+ return -EPERM;
+ if ((arg & FASYNC) && !(filp->f_flags & FASYNC) &&
+ filp->f_op->fasync)
+ filp->f_op->fasync(filp->f_inode, filp, 1);
+ if (!(arg & FASYNC) && (filp->f_flags & FASYNC) &&
+ filp->f_op->fasync)
+ filp->f_op->fasync(filp->f_inode, filp, 0);
+ filp->f_flags &= ~(O_APPEND | O_NONBLOCK | FASYNC);
+ filp->f_flags |= arg & (O_APPEND | O_NONBLOCK |
+ FASYNC);
+ return 0;
+ case F_GETLK:
+ return fcntl_getlk(fd, (struct flock *) arg);
+ case F_SETLK:
+ return fcntl_setlk(fd, cmd, (struct flock *) arg);
+ case F_SETLKW:
+ return fcntl_setlk(fd, cmd, (struct flock *) arg);
+ case F_GETOWN:
+ /*
+ * XXX If f_owner is a process group, the
+ * negative return value will get converted
+ * into an error. Oops. If we keep the the
+ * current syscall conventions, the only way
+ * to fix this will be in libc.
+ */
+ return filp->f_owner;
+ case F_SETOWN:
+ /*
+ * Add the security checks - AC. Without
+ * this there is a massive Linux security
+ * hole here - consider what happens if
+ * you do something like
+ *
+ * fcntl(0,F_SETOWN,some_root_process);
+ * getchar();
+ *
+ * and input a line!
+ *
+ * BTW: Don't try this for fun. Several Unix
+ * systems I tried this on fall for the
+ * trick!
+ *
+ * I had to fix this botch job as Linux
+ * kill_fasync asserts priv making it a
+ * free all user process killer!
+ *
+ * Changed to make the security checks more
+ * liberal. -- TYT
+ */
+ if (current->pgrp == -arg || current->pid == arg)
+ goto fasync_ok;
+
+ for_each_task(p) {
+ if ((p->pid == arg) || (p->pid == -arg) ||
+ (p->pgrp == -arg)) {
+ task_found++;
+ if ((p->session != current->session) &&
+ (p->uid != current->uid) &&
+ (p->euid != current->euid) &&
+ !suser())
+ return -EPERM;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if ((task_found == 0) && !suser())
+ return -EINVAL;
+ fasync_ok:
+ filp->f_owner = arg;
+ if (S_ISSOCK (filp->f_inode->i_mode))
+ sock_fcntl (filp, F_SETOWN, arg);
+ return 0;
+ default:
+ /* sockets need a few special fcntls. */
+ if (S_ISSOCK (filp->f_inode->i_mode))
+ {
+ return (sock_fcntl (filp, cmd, arg));
+ }
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+}
+
+void kill_fasync(struct fasync_struct *fa, int sig)
+{
+ while (fa) {
+ if (fa->magic != FASYNC_MAGIC) {
+ printk("kill_fasync: bad magic number in "
+ "fasync_struct!\n");
+ return;
+ }
+ if (fa->fa_file->f_owner > 0)
+ kill_proc(fa->fa_file->f_owner, sig, 1);
+ else
+ kill_pg(-fa->fa_file->f_owner, sig, 1);
+ fa = fa->fa_next;
+ }
+}